I“ t don’t look natural”:
St. Louis Smoke Abatement in 1906
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Beneath a view of the St. Louis skyline on February
11, 1906, Curt penned, “Did you ever see St. Louis with
an atmosphere as clear as shown on this picture? It don’t
look natural.” He mailed the postcard with his question
to Miss Bess N. Morgan at Fort Riley, Kansas. While
we do not know her reply, Curt’s question suggests that
both he and Bess were St. Louis residents, or at least
visited the city frequently enough to be familiar with its
atmosphere.
In 1906, coal was the most commonly used fuel in
St. Louis. Of the approximately 7,250,455 tons burned
annually, almost 95 percent was bituminous coal.1
That a clear sky during the winter of 1906 would be
considered unnatural gives testimony to the severity of
the thick, black smoke produced by burning soft coal
in St. Louis homes, offices, and factories. Curt’s smoke
observation no doubt echoed the experiences of many
residents. For example, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
reported in March 1905 that thick smoke prevented
prisoners from being put to work in the quarry due to
“the risk that many of them would escape”; in the fall
of 1906, the Globe-Democrat noted that coal smoke
had closed many public schools “on account of the
darkness.”2
As early as January 1823, the Missouri
Republican reported that “smoke has been in some
instances so dense as to render it necessary to use
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candles at midday.”3 When the great hardwood forests
surrounding St. Louis and in the American Bottom across
the Mississippi River were exhausted in the 1820s,
St. Louis began burning soft bituminous coal, readily
available from Illinois mines. Coal smoke plagued St.
Louis for more than a century until burning soft coal was
banned in 1940. Smoke abatement crusades ebbed and
flowed with periods of activity disrupting long stretches of
resigned acceptance that coal smoke was a necessary byproduct of progress as well as an emblem of growth. The
year of Curt’s post card, 1906, was one of public debate in
St. Louis about the best tactics for controlling coal smoke.
The first St. Louis smoke ordinance, passed in
1867, required that smoke stacks be at least twenty feet
higher than the adjacent structures. Most likely, this was
prompted by a successful lawsuit which awarded a Mr.
Whalen $50 in damages from his neighbor, a Mr. Keith,
for a stovepipe pouring smoke onto his property.4 By the
1880s, the Engineers’ Club of St. Louis had taken up the
smoke question and concluded that the obvious solution—
banning the burning of soft coal—was impractical, as
it would be too costly to St. Louis industry and risked
destroying the growth and prosperity of the city. They
advanced two solutions: educating boiler operators in the
proper methods of combustion to burn soft coal without
smoke, and inventing a device that would capture or
eliminate coal smoke. This engineering approach to smoke
abatement framed the debate until the late 1930s.
In 1893, St. Louis enacted its first ordinance
prohibiting “the emission into the open air of dense black
or thick gray smoke.” However, language drafted by the
Engineers’ Club exempted most firms because none of the
anti-smoke devices market actually worked as well as their
exaggerated claims. Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme
Court overturned the ordinance as unconstitutional
because the city had exceeded its authority.5 After the
Missouri legislature declared smoke a nuisance in cities
over 100,000 people, St. Louis passed a series of smoke
ordinances between 1901 and 1904 that declared the
“emission or discharge into the open air of dense smoke”
to be a misdemeanor, carrying a fine of $25 to $100
each day that smoke was discharged. The city created a
Smoke Abatement Department consisting of the Chief
Smoke Inspector, paid $150 per month, and five Deputy
Smoke Inspectors, each paid $100 per month. Again,
the ordinance contained a crippling loophole exempting
those who could show “that there is no known practicable
device, appliance, means or method” that could have
prevented their discharge of smoke.6
As St. Louis prepared for the World’s Fair, there was
considerable emphasis on making the whole city a modern

urban showcase for the millions who would visit. Speaking
to the Engineers’ Club in 1901, William H. Bryan
concluded, “I am in hopes that the World’s Fair authorities
will handle this problem [smoke] in an effective manner.
What could be more interesting and valuable than to show
an immense power plant developing thousands upon
thousands of horse power burning our own smoky fuels
with perfectly clear stacks? We can do this successfully,
and with a wide choice of apparatus. In so doing we would
give an object lesson to the world.”7 With the World’s
Fair located a few miles west of the industrial parts of
the city and mostly during summer months when heating
was not required, smoke was not a notable problem on the
Fairgrounds.
A late addition to the World’s Fair exhibits included
the nation’s first coal testing plant operated by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS). As the Fair was opening,
Congress appropriated $60,000 for testing “the coals and
lignites of the United States, in order to determine their
fuel values and the most economical method for their
utilization,” but required that all the machinery used and
coal samples tested be donated. With this restriction,
The traveling link grate, one of the “wide choice of
apparatus” to prevent smoke that William H. Bryan
discussed in his 1901 report to the St. Louis Engineers’
Club. (Journal of the Association of Engineering
Societies, December 1901, p. 228.)

Born in Germany, August and Edmund Donk immigrated
to Peoria, Illinois, as boys. In 1863, August, the older,
began his own coal company in St. Louis. His younger
brother joined the firm five years later; together they
became one of the largest coal merchants in St. Louis.
This 1888 advertisement was printed on the inside of a
post office letter sheet. (Author’s Collection)
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The U.S. Geological Survey Coal Testing Plant was built
in the back part of the World’s Fair Grounds. (Plate from
Report on the Operations of the Coal-Testing Plant on
the United States Geological Survey at the Louisiana
Purchase Exposition, St. Louis, Mo., 1904.)
testing did not begin until September 1904 when the
World’s Fair was half over. The initial USGS report,
published in 1906, concluded that coal gasification was
more energy efficient than simply burning bituminous
and lignite coals under steam boilers.8 Although
smoke abatement was not discussed directly, engineers
understood that fuel economy and smoke abatement were
two sides of the same coin. Another report, The Burning
of Coal without Smoke in Boiler Plants, was published
in 1908. Washington University mechanical engineering
faculty members were active in the USGS research and the
department became a leader in smoke abatement and coal
combustion research.9
Reading the Chief Smoke Inspector’s May 1906
annual report, one could easily conclude that St. Louis
would soon have clear skies. It listed 983 “manufacturing
concerns and other plants” that had installed “smoke
consuming devices” since 1901. It is interesting to note
that only about ten percent of that number had switched
to smokeless fuel or electric power; the balance were still
burning soft bituminous coal. Additionally, there were
228 heating plants, that had reduced their smoke output
by following instructions for the proper firing of a coal
furnace supplied by the department. C. H. Jones estimated
“that there has been a decrease of 80 to 85 percent in the
emission of dense smoke from boiler plants in this city.”10
These findings seem incongruous when contrasted with
Curt’s observation.
Knowing that the Civic League had spent the summer
studying smoke, Jones published a preemptive rebuttal
in October 1906 asserting that “a large majority of plants
in the city are complying with the law.” He claimed that
the diary kept by his department showed only four smoky
days since the first of the year, and two of these had east
winds. Jones identified four sources for the remaining
smoke in St. Louis: railroads, brick kilns, and blast
furnaces, which have “no known smoke device that can
be used”; furnaces in private residences whose smoke is
“sufficient to cover the entire city”; remaining smoke from
manufacturing plants due to “improper use of devices and
careless stoking”; and smoke from East St. Louis, which
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“is sufficient to cover the downtown district as far west as
Twelfth Street” when the wind is blowing from the east.
He viewed prosecution as a last resort to be used only
when violators refused to cooperate and were making no
efforts to remedy the situation. Jones recommended new
ordinances to license and regulate stationary firemen so
that coal fires would be properly stoked and to regulate
boilers to ensure that they were not overcrowded, poorly
ventilated, or insufficient to their task.11
The Smoke Nuisance, published by the Smoke
Abatement Committee of the Civic League in November
1906, began with a quote on the front cover—“The
way to abate smoke is not to make it”—and offered a
highly critical view of the St. Louis Smoke Abatement
Department:
		
It does not require the testimony of an
expert to convince the people of St. Louis that
the smoke nuisance has by no means been
satisfactorily abated. The dense clouds of
smoke that daily hang over the city, the layers
of soot that filter into office, parlor and sleeping
rooms, the throat irritation due directly to the
sulfur fumes in the smoke-laden air, the injured
trees and plants, the soiled linen and damaged
merchandise are all good and sufficient evidence
of the continued prevalence of this exasperating
nuisance.12
Despite the aggressive tone and their condemnation of
Jones for being too lenient in his prosecution of offenders,
the recommendations of the Smoke Abatement Committee
did not differ significantly from the solutions proposed
by the Chief Smoke Inspector. After acknowledging the
vast coal supplies within 100 miles of St. Louis and the
substantially higher cost of anthracite coal, the committee
concluded, “It is obvious that soft coal is and must
continue to be the chief fuel of this city.”13
Their report differed primarily in rejecting Jones’
arguments that residential furnaces and East St. Louis were
significant sources of smoke in St. Louis. “The amount
of smoke received from East St. Louis, even when the
winds are favorable, does not exceed ten per cent of the
total amount produced on this side of the river.”14 Having
interviewed coal dealers, the committee found that only
ten percent the soft coal sold in the city was consumed
in “domestic plants, open grates, stoves, ranges and
furnaces.”15 Like Jones, the committee placed considerable
emphasis on proper combustion. “Smoke is nothing more
nor less than ‘carbon in the wrong place.’ The secret to
smoke prevention is to secure complete combustion of
the fuel so that there will be no smoke to consume.”16 In
addition to the ordinances proposed by Jones, they added
one governing proper chimney height for boiler capacity
and draft. The committee also suggested that railroads
should be required to use smokeless fuel or electric power
if devices could not be found to control locomotive smoke,
and that if brick kilns could not be abated, they should
be driven from the residential parts of the city. The real

Photos such as this were used to strengthen the call for
smoke-abatement laws to be enacted in “Annual Report
of the Smoke Abatement Department for the Fiscal Year
1905-1906,” included in Mayor Rolla Wells’ annual
message in 1906. (Photo: State Historical Society of
Missouri Photo Collection)
complaint against the Smoke Abatement Department was
that, unlike the Smoke Abatement Committee, it was
not “filled with men who are qualified, by training or
experience, in the field of engineering.”17
Stung by the criticism of his office, Jones replied with
his own pamphlet in December, directing his counterattack
towards the two-faced behavior of selected members of
the Smoke Abatement Committee and the Civic League.
He pointed out that the same engineers who had recently
acknowledged his progress and praised the Smoke
Abatement Department now attacked him. Regarding
Washington University, he noted that the professors on
the committee had made no effort to persuade their own
institution to abate its smoke and that he had twice taken
the university to court. Moreover, a Civic League officer
was among the major violators of the smoke ordinance.

“He, while condemning us for not being more aggressive
in the prosecution of other people, not only did not think
we should bring him into court, but even resented the fact
that an inspector had the temerity to go into his office and
tell him he was violating the law.”18
Enforcement of anti-smoke ordinances by prosecution
continued to be a political issue until burning soft coal
was banned, because the civic leaders were indeed also the
business owners who created jobs and brought prosperity
to the city. After urging by the Civic League, the offices
of smoke inspector and inspector of boilers and elevators
were merged in 1910, and a mechanical engineer was
appointed to lead the new agency. Smoke inspectors
(engineers employed by the city to instruct owners in
the proper installation and operation of their coal-fired
equipment) embodied the Progressive Era values of
efficiency and education. They also signaled a growing
role for engineers and other technical experts in American
public life. Three visionary ideas in the 1906 Civic League
report accurately foreshadowed developments during the
next forty years that would provide viable alternatives to
burning soft coal. Centralized generation and distribution
of electricity provided an alternative to individual coalfired boilers. Central steam loops, replacing individual
heating plants, still operate in the St. Louis central
business district. While the report suggested large scale
coal-gasification plants, the completion of a natural gas
pipeline to St. Louis in 1949 accomplished the residential
switch from coal to gas.19
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